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This article explores the relationship between temporality, trauma and
responsibility in the novel Catch-22. Borrowing from psychoanalytic
theories of the drive, I develop a reading of the temporality of trauma in
general, and as related to the drives. This involves a delayed-reaction,
non-linear articulation of the trauma that is intimately linked in Catch-22
to the ways in which Yossarian is exposed to threats to his bodily
integrity. In response to an exposure of the finitude of his bodily
subjectivity, an initially passive attitude is engendered in Yossarian in
response to his traumatic “primal scene,” the death of Snowden. This
article is concerned with demonstrating how Yossarian ultimately
surpasses this sense of passivity and finitude in order to take
responsibility for his own trauma and the fantasies surrounding it.
Whilst the drives and trauma might be seen as ex-trinsic factors that
serve to limit or curtail subjective agency, with a more nuanced
understanding of the drives, trauma, and finitude itself, we can see
in Catch-22 an example of the paradoxical freedom that is manifested in
Yossarian in relation to his symptom. The manifest sense of
responsibility that Yossarian owns to is, however, matched by a latent
responsibility that is not broached in the text. The final part of this article
shows how, in comparison with Kurt Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse-Five,
Catch-22 elides further responsibilities that are left latent within the text.
As such, the comparison between the two texts dramatises the
contradictions and ambivalences involved in the act of representing war.
he following article will address the issue of war-related neuroses
and trauma, through a reading of Catch-22 and in the light of
psychoanalytic theories of the drive and temporality. In doing so, I
will demonstrate the contribution a psychoanalytically-derived criticism can
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make towards denoting registers of complicity and responsibility in war
writing. War can be seen as a particularly vexed field in which questions of
domination/submission, intersubjectivity, the power of ideology and the
workings of power in general can be addressed. As “prime movers” of
history, as cultural fault-lines in which existing divisions are exacerbated
and new divisions created, and as exemplary instances of the functioning of
State power (viz both its own subjects and other States), wars can be seen as
the historical “primal scenes” through which many subsequent ideological
developments are focalised. Most specifically, war poses the question to
cultural producers and consumers, of the extent to which it makes them
complicit in it; Catch-22 will be addressed insofar as it both accedes to and
avoids the complicities inherent in representing the spectacle of war. The
most pressing concern of the would-be counter-cultural war novel is how it
can represent war without somehow glamorising it or acting as an apologist
for its perpetrators.
My reading of the psychoanalytic register of temporality is heavily
indebted to Adrian Johnston’s masterful Time Driven: Metapsychology and
the Splitting of the Drive (2005), and the following analysis is intended to
exemplify several of Johnston’s key insights. It is initially useful to assess
some of the key aspects of war-related trauma from the perspective of the
history of military psychology. Whilst shell shock/PTSD can be made
manifest in different ways, there are consistent elements in many cases that
need to be stressed and that dovetail neatly with psychoanalytic notions of
trauma. The complex that became known as shell shock was, as is well
known, first popularised in World War I (though those well-read in military
history could have discerned most of its features through study of the
American Civil War). That shell shock was instrumental in forcing Sigmund
Freud to re-assess his idea that the psyche functioned according to the
pleasure principle is also well known, and points towards the discovery of
the war neuroses as one of the foundational traumas of psychoanalysis itself.
The “death drive,” one of Freud’s most problematic notions, was in a strong
sense the offspring of war-related trauma, and is similarly a theoretical-
clinical problematic that, until recently, had not been fully resolved. One of
the gambits of the following arguments is that a nuanced understanding of
the Freudian drive can shed further light on the problem of PTSD, despite
the general devaluation of psychoanalysis in the study and treatment of the
syndrome over the years. This, in turn, will shed further light on Catch-22. 
In some ways, the early history of military psychiatry echoes the
foundational schisms that beset the movement of psychoanalysis/
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psychology, resulting in a bifurcation between approaches centred either on
organic/biological causes, or on a strictly psychic causality behind the
trauma. In the light of this Manichean opposition, it is perhaps all the more
surprising that, firstly, a relatively consistent series of features can be (and
indeed were) assigned to war trauma from either perspective, and indeed
secondly that many common grounds were laid for the treatment of the
syndrome. Along with the ongoing debate as to the psychic or organic
origins of the trauma, the psychiatric community was similarly split over
“real” versus “imaginary” dimensions of the war neuroses (echoing Freud’s
oscillation between “real” and “imagined” scenes of parental seduction),
and the role of the analyst/therapist’s personality in advancing the treatment
(the classical psychoanalytic theme of transference). In short, the debates
over war neuroses echoed many of the key fault-lines within psychoanalytic
theory, the disciplinary lines of demarcation between psychoanalysis and
neuro-psychiatry, and the key problematics assumed by the psychoanalytic
discipline.
Whatever the disagreements over the nature of shell shock, there are
certain fundamental elements that were consistently denoted in the
syndrome, across disciplinary lines. The first and most important for the
purposes of this article is the relationship of the trauma to temporality. As
became increasingly obvious during the early studies of shell shock, the
trauma tended to operate in a non-linear fashion with regards to temporality.
A delayed reaction was often evident, a period of incubation for the trauma,
so to say, whereby its effects became evident, not necessarily immediately
after the traumatic event that precipitated it, but at some later time. In the
words of Ben Shepard, “a pilot of a B-17 bomber was able to come
seemingly untouched through a terrible experience” (xviii). Having seen the
body of a comrade “splattered over the windscreen” of his plane, the pilot
“had a momentary twinge of nausea,” but “as he did not know the man, the
horrifying spectacle was at an emotional distance” (xviii). With the passage
of time, however, “he was himself involved in emotionally distressing
events,” and “memories of the first incident came back to haunt and disturb
him” (xviii). 
This trajectory, where an initial traumatic episode is only experienced
as such retroactively, implies a second key aspect of the trauma; namely,
that the relationship between repression, the unconscious and temporality is
a constituent factor of many war neuroses. The “working hypothesis”
bequeathed to military psychiatrists not averse to Freudian ideas was that
“experience not directly accessible to consciousness” was directly related to
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“a process of active suppression of unpleasant material” (Shepard 87,
emphasis added). This “unpleasant material” was, though repressed, likely
to re-surface at a later date. Whilst the military psychiatrists rejected Freud’s
notion that a sexual origin lay behind all mental problems (including the war
neuroses), what was useful for many therapists was the mechanism his
repression-unconscious model outlined. 
Along similar lines, it was often the repetition of symptoms—traumatic
dreams and the like—that were proof of the presence of war neuroses.
Wholly against the idea of the subject as an organism devoted to homeostasis
and ruled by the pleasure principle, nightmarish scenes were continually
revisited by the patient. What is most telling here from a psychoanalytic
perspective is that the insistent, irrational demands of the drive characterised
these repetitions, a trajectory which seemingly operated irrespective of any
demand for gratification or resolution in the patient. The overwhelming
impression was of a patient entirely subject to the insistence of the traumatic
drives, and this can be linked to the passivity experienced by the subject in
relation to the originary, foundational traumatic event. Studies during World
War I indicated that exposure to the events of war triggered instinctual “fight
or flight” patterns in the troops. Owing to the static nature of trench warfare,
however (or indeed the claustrophobic environment of an aeroplane as
inhabited by Yossarian), the “flight” instinct was mostly curtailed (and the
“fight” instinct was largely inhibited), leaving the subject with few outlets to
compensate for the “loss of control” imposed upon him by the situations of
war. Yossarian’s impassioned screaming at his pilot during evasive action,
“hard, hard you bastard,” provides an indication of this contradiction. In this
context we can see the traumatic drives as strictly related to the position of
passivity invariably forced upon combatants, or indeed as being the very
means of working through this sense of passivity. 
Within psychoanalytic theory there are several approaches to trauma
that shed light on the issue of war neuroses. Kirsten Hyldgaard describes
trauma as resulting from a “senseless accident”: “A trauma is understood
as an event without necessity; a cause for the subject as an accidental,
contingent event … an event that does not make sense, or rather a senseless
event that has to be made sense of, an event that hereafter will be the
foundation of sense” (74). Similarly, but in a more psychoanalytic language,
Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis describe trauma as follows:
An event in the subject’s life defined by its intensity, by the
subject’s incapacity to respond adequately to it, and by the
upheaval and long-lasting effects that it brings about in the
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psychical organisation. In economic terms, the trauma is
characterised by an influx of excitations that is excessive by the
standard of the subject’s tolerance and capacity to master such
excitations and work them out psychically. (465)
What  should be stressed from the above is, firstly, the contingent nature
of the “accidental event”; the subject’s own contingency is in effect
dramatised by the traumatic event, embodying the strictly ex-trinsic and
alienated nature of subjectivity in general (as well as the particular
alienation brought about by the trauma). Secondly, we see in both of the
above characterisations the idea of an “excess” of affect in relation to
“sense”; whilst Laplanche and Pontalis at this stage describe the process in
terms of “energy” (echoing Freud’s earlier quasi-biological stance), along
the lines of the Lacanian turn it may well be more productive to view the
excess that besets the subject in terms of signification. Along these lines
Hyldgaard’s description of a “senseless event that has to be made sense of”
(74) sets the response to trauma at the level of translation and meaning,
and, more pertinently still, in terms of “an event that hereafter will be
the foundation of sense” (74). Thirdly, then, not only is the trauma related
to sense and meaning, but in Hyldgaard’s terms is “hereafter” the very
“foundation of sense.” 
The trauma, then, in this reading, poses an insoluble question of
meaning that the subject cannot but assume and attempt to master. Again in
the words of Laplanche and Pontalis:
An excessive influx of excitation immediately halts the operation
of the pleasure principle obliging the psychic apparatus to carry
out a more urgent task “beyond the pleasure principle,” which
consists in binding the excitations in such a way as to allow for
their subsequent discharge. The repetitive dreams in which the
subject relives the accident intensely, placing himself once more in
the traumatic situation as if attempting to master it, is attributed to
a repetition compulsion. (468, emphasis added)
The apparent passivity of the subject in the face of the drives is somewhat
qualified in the above passage. Whilst the repetitive trajectory is described
as a “compulsion,” Laplanche and Pontalis’ emphasis on “binding” and
“mastery” implies that the subject’s role in this trajectory is not purely
passive/regressive, and that the subject has a complicit role in the
repetition, which actually attempts to domesticate or defuse the trauma
through its iteration. This “turning-around” of the seemingly passive
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position of the subject in relation to the drive is key in my reading of
Catch-22, where it will be demonstrated that the reflexive trajectory of the
drive precludes our reading the drives as a force that simply imposes itself,
ex nihilo as it were, upon the subject. 
This iterative “compulsion,” however, can be viewed not just as a
feature of the aetiology of trauma (narrowly defined) but of subjectivity
itself in relation to temporality and the drives. Johnston’s wide-ranging
intervention on the psychoanalytic theories of the drives sets the issue of
temporality at their very heart; indeed, he makes the strong statement that
psychoanalysis as a whole “is fundamentally a philosophical insight into the
subject’s relationship with temporality” (xxix). The insertion of a more
nuanced view of temporality within the conceptualisation of the drives is
performed by Johnston via two distinct temporal axes, the “axis of iteration”
and the “axis of alteration”: “The salient features of the Freudian-Lacanian
Trieb reveal themselves through a focus on the intractable conflict between
the repetitious (a)temporality of the axis of iteration and the bi-directional,
dialectical temporality of the axis of alteration” (217). Put quite simply, we
can understand the axis of iteration to correspond broadly with a metonymic
view of temporality as ineffably driven forwards. Repetition is motored, in
this view, by a “cyclical temporality forcefully ignoring chronological
consequences” (Johnston 154), and the axis of iteration represents the
compulsive aspect of the drive that senselessly repeats itself in the same way
found in Freud’s death drive. The axis of alteration, on the other hand,
approximates a metaphorical view of the drive; as opposed to its ceaseless
self-repetition, aiming to restore a “lost state,” the axis of alteration
condemns the iterated drive as impossible, by disseminating its avatars
across a plane of “alteration,” which means that each particular act of
repetition fails to repeat exactly what it seeks to re-iterate. The intractable
conflict outlined by Johnston is thus that, whilst the axis of iteration can do
nothing but repeat past experiences/mental states, the axis of alteration
prevents this repetition from ever recapitulating the same experience.
Exactly what the drives seek to repeat is a matter to be further
discussed. What must be maintained, however, is that in Johnston’s terms
the drives are “internally fissured” and self-defeating because of the
conflicting temporal registers they partake of. We must, therefore, come
to an understanding of the drive that allows for this constitutive duality
and antagonism, a conflict that is internal to each and every drive. In the
words of Lorenzo Chiesa, “[t]he (drive) is both that which retroactively
transforms the primordial undead Real into the Symbolic … and, given its
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subtractive nature, that which tends to transform the Symbolic into the
undead ‘inorganic’ Real—it is only in the latter sense in which Lacan says
that the drives tend towards the Thing” (144). Notice, in the above, the stress
on retroactive transformation—i.e., that the drives only become operative in
a deferred way—and also the fact that a dual (and seemingly contradictory)
operation is granted to the drives. The drives are, then, both synthetic
and anti-synthetic, in the sense that they both “transform the … undead
real into the Symbolic” (144), and can also convert the Symbolic “into the
undead ‘inorganic’ Real.” The drives, then, “tend” towards either their
own substantialisation within the Symbolic or their desubstantialisation
within the Real. 
We must also come to terms with the role of the body within this
conceptualisation of the drives. Again, in Johnston’s words, “drive is, at one
and the same time, the unmasterable ‘thrust’ of the Real body, as well as the
overdetermining automaton of the symbolic structures dictating the course of
the libidinal economy. This bivalence of Trieb demands a theory that takes
into account an internal split, a dehiscence between Real and Symbolic”
(369). Alongside the “dehiscence” forced upon the subject by the twin,
irreconcilable temporal axes outlined by Johnston, we must also account for
the constitutive contradiction between, on the one hand, the Real (represented
here by the body), and on the other hand the Symbolic. Contrary to those
interpreters of Jacques Lacan that propound a pan-linguistic model in which
repetition is solely the result of the automatism of the signifying chain (an
understandable tendency given many of Lacan’s positions), Johnston stresses
the dialectical relationship between the subjective body and the Symbolic.
It is in the complex inter-relationship between the (Real) body and the
external world of signs that I wish to assert a certain correspondence
between war neuroses and psychoanalytic theories of trauma in general, and
to do so we must first examine the Freudian phenomenon of “propping.”
The theory of propping or leaning-on was “rediscovered” by Laplanche
and Pontalis in Freud’s work, and goes some way towards explaining some
of the more troubling aporia of Freud’s drive theory in Beyond the Pleasure
Principle (1925). Put simply, Freud pointed to both death and life drives, to
drives that tend towards a former inorganic state (death drives), and those
which are aligned with self-preservative instincts and the pleasure principle
(life drives). What Freud overlooked, in the view of Laplanche and
Pontalis, was the tendency of the death drive to “graft” itself, or to be
“alloyed” to, various functions centred on the self-preservative registers that
are supposedly inimical to it. Sexual drives, to give the most obvious
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example, partake of both death drives (they are irrational and seek only
their own continuation) and life drives (in tending towards reproductive
functions they participate in the register of self-preservation). This is why
Lacan says that “any drive is a death-drive” (Ecrits: Complete Edition in
English 848), insofar as the identification of a “pure” life-drive
unadulterated by the “irrational” processes of the death-drive is strictly
speaking impossible. 
What is at stake in the drives, then, is the placement of the subjective
body in relation to the external register of the symbolic. There is an ineffable
crossover between these registers:
Lacan speaks of “accidents of the body,” thereby indicating that
he views the material, biological substratum of the Imaginary …
as a mere contingency. The contours of the body are not logical
necessities; perhaps the body could have been formed differently.
Necessity, for Lacan, resides in the fact that this material
contingency inevitably gives rise to certain non-material effects.
(Johnston 263, emphasis added)
This article is very much concerned with assessing the contingent nature of
the body as displayed in Catch-22 and the necessity of the accidents that
befall it giving rise to certain non-material effects. The central aspect of my
argument here is that the “immanent co-implication” that psychoanalysis
identifies between self-preservative and libidinal functions can be reversed
in the case of war trauma. Whilst the sexual drive alloys itself to self-
preservative functions, it is my contention that the trauma instigated in the
war neuroses (one where the self-preservation of the body is called into
question and threatened), by reverse, alloys itself to a repetitive trajectory
more commonly ascribed to the sexual drives. In effect, in the war neuroses
we are shown a reverse-propping tendency where the self-preservative
processes “lean on” the self-destructive tendencies of sexuality. In terms of
Catch-22, it is my contention that the very contingency ascribed to the body
above is at the heart of the text’s traumatic register, a trauma which is
compulsively repeated along the lines of an axis of iteration, and gradually
widened in scope according to the vicissitudes of the axis of alteration. It is
the alterations that are represented in Yossarian’s trauma that will ultimately
prove to be significant. Let us now examine the novel itself in terms of the
above arguments, bringing them to bear on the text, and also crucially, using
the textual analysis as an opportunity to expand upon the definitions
advanced so far.
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Repetition is in itself one of the key strategies employed in Catch-22.
Some of the repetitions are primarily of interest for their picayune
humour, but I wish to focus on those that provide key insights into the
very formal fabric of the text. In terms of its textual modes of repetition,
temporality itself is inevitably to the fore in Catch-22. The constant
analepses of the text are centred on certain key motifs, the most prominent
of which is the number of missions required for one of the airmen to be sent
home. This number, like the fleeting object of desire in psychoanalytic
theory, is both raised and lowered according to the chronological
oscillations of the text, a carrot ineffably held out of reach for the characters
in the text, until it becomes something of a fetish. Insofar as the airmen do
not receive their ticket home, and the number of missions required gradually
increases (like an object of desire that is forever “to come”), this motif
expresses both a sense of temporal movement—we can identify textual
chronology according to how many missions were required at the time
(“back when only forty-five missions were required for him to pack his bags
for home”)—and, crucially, an overwhelming sense of stasis and futility or
fatalism. “Plus ça change…”: whatever the number of missions required at
a given moment in the text, the airmen themselves are prey to a debilitating
sense of stasis that undermines or compromises any sense of chronological
progression (60). 
Other repeated motifs add a spatial component to the text. The
references to Ferrara (“where they had to go back over the target and
Kraft got killed”), to Avignon (where Snowden was killed) and to Bologna
(the bogeyman for the airmen because of the concentrations of anti-
aircraft fire there) mix certain locales into the temporal fabric of the text as
“primal settings,” so to say (157). Yossarian’s intense meditations on the
variety of potential dangers and illnesses from which he is at risk (that, as
will be discussed, are themselves projections of the very specific fear which
is repressed in him) provides another repeated motif, of the endlessly
displaceable nature of bodily fear. Finally, the repetition of Orr’s teasing
questioning of Yossarian, which only gains significance for Yossarian
retroactively, underlines the commitment of the text to expressing an effect
of afterwards-ness (or deferred action) not only in relation to trauma, but in
relation to knowledge itself. The most frequently-repeated motif in the text,
however, is the evocation of Snowden’s death—referred to no less than
eight times—and it is this recurring primal scene that forms the centrepiece
of my reading of Catch-22.
The Snowden scene is to be analysed in terms of, firstly, its aetiology
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as trauma, and secondly, the concurrent responses this trauma elicits in
Yossarian. The second aspect is key, as without a notion of the subjective
transformation of the drive through praxis we are given a distinctly
pessimistic view of the “determined” nature of subjectivity in relation to the
drives. The basic theme of these scenes as a sequence is of the gradual
unveiling of the scene in full, as it were. In each successive iteration, more
detail is given and the scene is more fully rendered. It is as though the
traumatic nature of the scene provides in Laplanche’s earlier terms “an
excessive influx of excitation,” which necessarily cannot be fully articulated
upon its first evocation, until the necessary “binding” and “mastery” have
occurred whereby its more traumatic resonances might be “worked out
psychically.” In the words of Chiesa (apropos the horror film still),
[w]hen the subject freezes the shocking scene … he is accidentally
watching unaware of its traumatic content … when he organises
the unbearable encounter … that causes anxiety … he both obtains
a “still” that protects him from the trauma (through the imaginary
objectification of the scene), and lets himself be partially
traumatised (through the real scene that underlies its imaginary
objectification). (149, emphasis in original; emphasis added)
It is instructive, indeed perhaps essential, to analyse the exact contexts in
which the Snowden scene is replayed via Yossarian’s point of view. Let us
view the entire sequence in turn, with attendant commentary. The replaying
of the Snowden scene often arises out of Yossarian’s own physical fears,
which can be brought about either by a generalised anxiety, or from a
specific reference to the recent demise of one of his comrades. The very
first reference to Snowden, and the only one that does not arise from one
of the above two causes, comes in the “educational sessions”—“where are
the Snowdens of yesteryear?” (39). Without any further, contextualizing
explication at this point, Snowden immediately takes on the status of an
enigma, the fundamental question or problem to be worked out in the
text. The second evocation of the scene follows the first of several
representations of the terrors of air combat, most specifically with reference
to Yossarian’s pre-eminence in the art of “evasive action”; “there was no
established procedure to evasive action. All you needed was fear” (56). This
then segues into the second allusion to the Snowden scene, where, crucially,
Snowden himself is not represented (it is seemingly a memory that is, at this
stage, too traumatic); we have “help him, help him,” “the bombardier,” then
Yossarian’s “I’m the bombardier, I’m alright” (57). Only then are we given
32 Ian Edwards
the frame of reference for the request to help him, and even then Snowden
himself is not portrayed, we are simply told “[a]nd Snowden lay dying in
back” (57). The dying body of Snowden is at this stage, then, foreclosed,
and insofar as the chapter ends abruptly on this note, the text itself performs
another form of evasive action, peeling away from directly representing his
death.
The second and third iterations of the Snowden scene both arise
following Yossarian’s pathological ruminations on disease, the “hernias and
haemorrhoids” and so on that attend his presence in the hospital:
People gave up the ghost with delicacy and taste inside the
hospital. There was none of that crude, ugly ostentation about
dying that was so common outside the hospital. They did not blow
up in midair like Kraft or the dead man in Yossarian’s tent, or
freeze to death in the blazing summertime the way Snowden had
froze to death after spilling his secret to Yossarian in the back of
the plane. (291) 
This initial reference to Snowden “spilling his secret to Yossarian” adds a
further, elliptical sense in which Snowden forms the central enigma of the
text, as the exact nature of the secret he embodies is held in abeyance until
the final iteration of the scene. The next (fourth) evocation of the scene
similarly connects Snowden’s secret, which he “had spilled all over the back
of the plane,” with the multitude of “bartenders, bricklayers and bus
conductors all over the world who wanted [Yossarian] dead,” not to mention
the “lymph glands that might do him in,” and the “Hodgkins’ disease,
leukaemia, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis” and so on (198). 
The specifically traumatic nature of the scene, then, is definitively
connected to Yossarian’s threatened sense of his own bodily integrity (or the
potential lack thereof). This is placed into greater relief with the next (fifth)
rendition of the scene:
That was the mission on which Yossarian lost his nerve. Yossarian
lost his nerve on a mission because Snowden lost his guts, and
Snowden lost his guts because their pilot that day was Huple …
and their co-pilot was Dobbs, who was even worse. (258)
The relevance of Huple and Dobbs being Yossarian’s pilots will only
become meaningful later in the text, through the après-coup temporal
mechanism by which Yossarian finally comes to understand Orr’s teasing
(this will be dealt with in greater detail later in this essay). For now,
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however, what is pertinent is that a direct connection is made between
Snowden “losing his guts” and Yossarian “losing his nerve.” From an
initially enigmatic allusion, through several iterations, the Snowden scene
gradually accretes extra details; insofar as Snowden’s body is represented,
it is done so in a piecemeal fashion (as with the scene itself) that again
suggests its full impact is at first too traumatic to articulate. Snowden next
appears (the sixth time) again as a remainder rather than a fully-rendered
body: “ the day of the Avignon mission when Yossarian climbed down the
few steps of his plane naked, in a state of utter shock, with Snowden
smeared abundantly all over his bare heels and toes, knees, arms and
fingers” (298). Yossarian’s own body is here rendered as a series of body-
parts (“heels and toes, knees arms and fingers”), thereby set in relation to the
portrayal of Snowden’s eviscerated frame. In Lacanian terms we can see the
“smearing” of Snowden as a horrifying remainder of the (bodily) Real that
intrudes into the Symbolic, again reminding us that the (Real) body and the
signifying system are “immanently co-implicated” in trauma. 
As opposed to being linked with Yossarian’s own fear, however, the
final two renderings of the Snowden scene—and, crucially, by far the most
detailed ones—are related to the deaths of his comrades. The seventh
iteration of the scene is also strongly linked with the enigma that Orr poses
for Yossarian, again indicating the significance of Huple and Dobbs in the
final outcome of Yossarian’s symptom. Firstly, the scene is prefigured by
the spectacle of Orr’s plane crashing, of yet another one of Yossarian’s
comrades (seemingly) being killed. The iteration of the Snowden scene
occurs in the context, then, of Yossarian’s other-directed anxiety on behalf
of his fellow airmen, as opposed to the earlier, alienated solipsism that
characterises his angst. The second key element of this particular rendering
lies in the fact that Yossarian admits to himself that he always-already knew
that flying with Huple and Dobbs would be a disaster, “two vapid strangers,
a beardless kid named Huple and a nervous nut like Dobbs” (380). This only
assumes its full significance in the context of the offer made to Yossarian by
Orr to fly with him, and this is an offer that is only represented later when
we learn of Orr’s escape (it becomes another example of the “après-coup”
modality of knowledge). 
The final rendition of the Snowden scene follows the news of Hungry
Joe’s death, and Yossarian’s realisation that now all of his comrades have
been killed. This time the scene is laid bare over five pages of the novel,
with the plaintive cry of “I’m cold” from Snowden, which is a constant
theme in nearly all the repetitions of the scene, providing punctuating marks
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between the representations of Snowden’s body. Snowden is represented in
terms of the “gory scarlet flow behind the twitching, startling fibres of weird
muscle” (501), the “live hamburger meat” his flesh resembles (502) and the
“liver, lungs, kidneys, ribs, stomach, and bits of stewed tomatoes Snowden
had eaten that day for lunch” (504). Put in such terms the body can scarcely
seem anything but horrifying and traumatic; it is interesting to note that the
representation of the body as “meat,” and the way various organs such as
liver and kidneys (that are associated with edible meats) suddenly segues
into a description of what Snowden himself has eaten. The highly contingent
nature of the body is finally placed into full relief, as the text finally lays
forth the secret than Snowden had spilled: “He felt goose pimples … as he
gazed down despondently at the secret that Snowden had spilled all over the
messy floor. It was easy to read the message in his entrails. Man was matter,
that was Snowden’s secret. The spirit gone, man was garbage. That was
Snowden’s secret. Ripeness was all” (504).
Insofar as the secret that man is matter is what the text carefully
husbands until the very last moment, we can assume it is this revelation that
makes the Snowden scene so traumatic for Yossarian, necessitating a
considerable period of incubation and a considerable amount of binding and
mastery before it can be articulated. Put one way, the Snowden scene
educates Yossarian into the nature of his bodily integrity, or more precisely
the lack thereof, leading him to consider his relationship to his body as one
of finitude. This is all the more to the point insofar as it is a conclusion that
Yossarian, early in the text, wholly denies:
As far back as Yossarian could recall … someone was always
hatching a plot to kill him. … but they couldn’t touch him, he told
Clevinger, because he had a sound mind in a pure body … they
couldn’t touch him because he was Tarzan, Mandrake, Flash
Gordon ... 
“ … I’m a bona fide supraman.” (22)
It is perhaps owing to this extreme conviction that the (conflicting) nature
of Snowden’s secret is so traumatic, and thus initially repressed. In the
words of Slavoj ÎiÏek (apropos the “pure fatalism” engendered by the
knowledge of the genetic determinism operative in DNA) “can one imagine
a clearer situation of ‘traversing the fantasy’ and being confronted with the
utterly meaningless real of a contingency determining our life? No wonder
that the majority of people choose ignorance” (Organs Without Bodies 124).
Yossarian is in this view confronted, via the Snowden scene, with the utterly
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meaningless real of a contingency determining our life (“Man was matter”);
the utopian strain that counterbalances the anti-utopian implications of the
scene is that Yossarian (eventually) does traverse this fantasy, rather than
choosing ignorance. 
Some further concepts within the field of psychoanalysis can help to
bring out the full nature of Yossarian-as-symptom, so to say, before moving
onto the sense of responsibility that is (belatedly) evoked in the final pages
of the text. To begin with, we can certainly characterise Yossarian along the
lines of a particular view of anxiety, which is in Johnston’s terms the source
of the drive-pressure, and is a result of the two, conflicting temporal axes:
… anxiety is the by-product of the irreconcilable conflict between
the iterated insistence of the drive-source and the axis of alteration
(wherein this insistence is mediated).
Despite this innate incapacity of the axis of alteration to
adequately respond to the insistence of a pure repetition of an
always-already lost past, the drive-source tirelessly continues to
make its demands.
Anxiety is produced by the simultaneous impossibility of
gratifying the drive-source coupled with the refusal of the drive-
source to acknowledge this limit. (287)
Again, despite the pessimistic conclusions that might be drawn from what
Johnston presents as an irreconcilable conflict, it should be stressed that the
permanent structure of anxiety in terms of the “insistent” demands of the
drive does not imply a determined, un-free subject. Indeed, as the following
analysis will show, “anxiety has got everything to do with freedom”
(Hyldgaard 70). The problem worsens, in any case, when repression comes
onto the scene, for as Johnston says “repression transforms determinate fear
into the amorphous, vague affect of anxiety” (275), a description which ties
in neatly with the profusion of fears listed by Yossarian, who seems to suffer
a generalised dread of just about everything.
In terms of the situation enforced upon Yossarian, it is clear that his
“self-preservative” instinct is very much curtailed by military hegemony,
and that the anxiety that arises from this expresses the contradictions of his
position. To cite Johnston once more, Yossarian embodies “the tension
between temporal movement and timeless stasis, this tension being the
motor-force behind the perpetual, ceaseless activities of the drives” (228).
The sense of timeless stasis enforced upon him by his subjection to
hegemony is heightened by the plus ça change effect of the constant raising
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of the number of missions required (thus making the text seem “timeless”),
and is directly in conflict with the flight instinct the environment ex-cites in
him. It is as though, put another way, Yossarian-as-symptom is evoked as
“precisely instinct once caught between nature and reason” (Johnston 335),
with his “instinct” being aligned with self-preservation and “reason”
standing for his socio-symbolic superego and the demands of society (or, in
different psychoanalytic terms, within him there is a conflict between desire
and the law). Broadly speaking, then, I have outlined a trajectory of trauma
for Yossarian as follows: 
bodily finitude/contingency (passivity) → anxiety
(source-pressure)→drive
What remains to be demonstrated is the way this complex is worked through
in the text towards some kind of resolution. It is after his reconciliation with
some sense of responsibility that Yossarian departs from the text and the
remainder of this section will show how this sense of responsibility is made
manifest.
The mode of “working-through” or mastering anxiety and the drives is
defined as “traversing the fantasy” in Lacanian terms. The “fundamental
fantasy” is “knitted” together, so to say, by a “master-signifier,” and in the
words of Chiesa,
[n]eurotics can eventually turn their ideological symptom—the
jouissance imposed by hegemonic fundamental fantasies—into a
nonpsychotic sinthome when they undergo the traversal of the
fundamental fantasy, the moment of separation from the Symbolic
and the subsequent process of symbolic reinscription through a
new, individualized master-signifier. (189, emphasis in original)
The remainder of this article will analyse the process through which
Catch-22 traverses the fundamental fantasy represented by Snowden, the
way it overturns the fundamental passivity of this primal scene, and how a
key part of Yossarian’s reinscription is the need to establish a different
relationship to the symbolic Big Other. We should note, however, that it is
a conflict that is strictly speaking irreconcilable. As Johnston notes, “the
antagonism between the two axes inherent to all drives is not an opposition
capable of eventual resolution” (229), and this is exactly why Lacan states
that “all drives are Trieb to come” (60). This cautionary note might well
help to explain the tactic of ending the text with Yossarian in mid-flight—
as representative of “Trieb to come”—in the “future-imperfect,” so to say. 
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Insofar as Yossarian does (partially) traverse the fantasy of the Snowden
scene, we should note what exactly in the scene changes in the course of
its iterations, and what elements remain the same. What remains of the
symptom, once Yossarian has worked-through the scene to its resolution, is
the ever-present threat to his bodily integrity, as represented by the (similarly
repetitive) murderous impulses of Nately’s whore, and the ambivalence that
could lead to Nately’s whore being read as a representation of either life or
death (or both, simultaneously). What changes is that, firstly, Yossarian has
“chosen” to “own” his fear—“it proves you’re still alive” (519). Secondly,
the danger he now faces is highly personalised, as opposed to the faceless
enemies that beset him before. Finally, and most crucially, he now has a
“project” or “responsibility” outside himself (the salvation of Nately’s
whore’s sister), as a counterweight to the impending dangers he is willing to
assume. Furthermore, whilst the “axis of alteration” might not seem to wreak
many changes on the Snowden scene itself, other than to gradually unveil
it, there is a crucial change in emphasis. The repeated verbal motif of most
of the earlier renderings is Snowden’s “I’m cold.” Whilst this is repeated in
the final scene, the scene finishes with Yossarian’s tender solicitude for
the dying Snowden—“there, there”—which is portrayed for the first
time. The plaintive plea from the other, then, whilst it is repeated in several
of the prior scenes, is only in the final evocation of the scene met with a
response from Yossarian. It is as though this ethical charge—let us call it a
responsibility—was in itself somehow traumatic (working on the basis that
the most traumatic material is generally slowest to emerge) and at the heart
of Yossarian’s symptom. What Pynchon terms a “kindness-instinct beyond
extinction” in Gravity’s Rainbow (314) emerges as the minimal structure of
subjectivity necessary for Yossarian to assume his responsibility.
The above arguments should not be taken to imply that the drives
necessitate a pessimistic view of the determined nature of subjectivity. As is
implicit in one of Hyldgaard’s formulations, the “fundamental fantasy”
which gentrifies the drive-trauma can be read as entailing a degree of choice
at the level of the subject, however minimal:
Fantasy can be understood as the unconscious response, the
unconscious interpretation of this “primitive scene,” this accidental,
contingent event; it is an original choice of interpretation that has
become the screen through which the world is perceived, a screen
which shows itself in the way the subject poses—his or her attitude.
(Hyldgaard 78, emphasis added)
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This “original choice of interpretation” places a minimal responsibility upon
the subject for his own fantasy. Put one way, whilst the demands of the
drives are incessant, this does not mean that we are void of all agency in the
face of them. In the face of the drives, we are “not free not to choose,” to put
it in a Sartrean vein. As an initial question, along these lines, we might ask
ourselves why, exactly, Yossarian is so traumatised by the Snowden scene,
and why indeed his last ministrations for the dying Snowden necessitate
the most thorough repression of all the elements in the “fundamental
fantasy” that emerges from the scene. One answer might be that it is his
(repressed) sense of responsibility for the other in this scene that emerges as
its “traumatic kernel,” a responsibility that only emerges retroactively via
the effects of the après-coup temporal loop of the text. The notion of
responsibility is then reversed during the text, from the view that Yosssarian
questions so regularly—of his responsibility to his country and his superior
officers—towards a very different idea. 
Part of this reversal is enacted by means of the changing relationship of
Yossarian to the Big Other of military hegemony. Whilst he poses an enigma
and a problem for the authorities, it is crucial to note that Yosssarian’s
subversive activities are carried out largely within the remit of the game of
power, so to say. In his incessant questioning, and his attempt to hold the
power-structure to account on the grounds of its own principles, Yossarian
actually permits the authorities to continually hit him with catch-22. His mode
of questioning is in Lacanian terms directed towards the Big Other, and as
long as he continues to do so, the master-signifier of hegemony is left
undisturbed. An alternative way out of the annular, insidious cycle of drive-
trauma is suggested by ÎiÏek, especially relevant insofar as it alludes to the
subject’s relationship to wider power-structures: “In an ‘ontological state of
emergency,’ one should suspend one’s sociosymbolic identity and act as if
this identity is unimportant, a matter of indifference” (Organs Without Bodies
51, emphasis in original). Something very much akin to this process is
apparent in Catch-22, whereby the status of ontological freedom is maintained
despite, or indeed paradoxically because of, the manifest limitations placed on
that freedom (Sartre’s comment that the French were “never so free” as
when they were occupied by the Germans comes to mind). Part of this
process lies in the changing relationship of Yossarian to the master-signifier.
When he says that he is “not running away from his responsibilities, but
running to them” (516), this exchanges a (hegemonic) view of responsibility
to his “sociosymbolic identity,” to a more (existential) view of responsibility
to himself (not to mention Nately’s whore’s sister). In ÎiÏek’s terms,
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[w]hat one should focus, on, rather, is demand as a way to drive;
that is to say, what one needs is a demand no longer addressed to
the Other. Both desire and demand rely on the other—either a full
(omnipotent) other of demand or a “castrated” other of the law; the
task, therefore, is fully to assume the non-existence of the Other.
(The Parallax View 296, emphasis in original)
In a vulgar deterministic view we might see trauma as being inimical to
freedom; if the trauma is, in psychoanalytic terms, “that which is in you
more than you,” a cipher for the ineffable intrusion of the extrinsic within
psychic life, then this otherness might be seen to curtail subjective agency.
This would be to characterise the true nature of ontological freedom in a
much too narrow and simplistic way, however, as if freedom were a
substantial, positive essence pre-existing subjective choice. To refer back to
an earlier citation from Hyldgaard, “anxiety has everything to do with
freedom”, and similarly freedom is a “hole in being” (71). This seeming
hole or void, however, has utopian implications in the sphere of the
noumenal will. In ÎiÏek’s words, freedom exists “in the very gap between
the noumenal and the phenomenal”; “the way out of this predicament [of the
subject’s finitude] is to assert that we are free insofar as we are noumenally
autonomous, but our cognitive perspective remains constrained to the
phenomenal level” (Organs Without Bodies 43, emphasis in original).
Yossarian ultimately assumes his “noumenal autonomy” in spite of the
contingencies and limitations that beset him at the phenomenal level. The
Snowden scene, in the light of this insight, paradoxically instantiates
Yossarian’s freedom (via retroactive temporality): “Freedom is ultimately
nothing but the space opened up by the traumatic encounter, the space to be
filled in by its contingent/inadequate symbolisations/translations” (Organs
Without Bodies 99, emphasis in original).
The naïve view of trauma as forming nothing but a limit to freedom and
agency is a corollary to a similarly naïve view of subjectivity as being
predicated upon an initial/originary state of homeostasis. In an alternative
reading, this homeostatic state is actually a mythical one, one whose
assumption by the subject is actually the foundational traumatic event of
subjectivity:
Consciousness, at its most elementary, is the awareness of a
disturbance of the organism’s homeostasis caused by an encounter
with an external (or internal object) which serves as its “occasion.”
The subject (of consciousness) is not the organism whose
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homeostasis precedes every disturbance, and who strives to re-
establish this homeostasis after every disturbance; the subject
emerges through the disturbance of the organism’s homeostasis; it
“is” the very activity of dealing with disturbances. (The Parallax
View 223, emphasis added)
As the clause “it ‘is’ the very activity of dealing with disturbances” implies,
the traumatic disturbance of the would-be homeostatic organism is, then, not
inimical to, but the foundational instance of its reflexive self-consciousness;
the self only intuits itself through the very activity of “dealing with
disturbances.” Far from the trauma itself being a “violent imposition” upon
subjectivity, ÎiÏek neatly reverses this emphasis: “Freedom is not a
blissfully neutral state of harmony and balance, but the very violent act that
disturbs this balance” (The Parallax View 282). In his beautifully phrased
conclusion Johnston puts it thus:
Despite the apparent bleakness and anti-utopianism of an
assessment of human nature as being perturbed by an irreducible
inner antagonism, there is, surprisingly, what might be described as
a liberating function of the drives. In fact, subjects are forced to be
free, since, for such beings, the mandate of nature is forever
missing. Severed from a biological master-program and saddled
with a conflict-ridden, heterogenous jumble of contradictory
impulses … the parlêtre has no choice but to bump up against the
unnatural void of its autonomy. The confrontation of this void is
frequently avoided. (Johnston 341, emphasis in original)
As I hope I have made clear, I view the trajectory of Catch-22 as embodying
just such a confrontation of the unnatural void of Yossarian’s autonomy
(which is, to begin with, avoided).
It is crucial to maintain, however, that this sense of freedom can only
be recognised and assumed retroactively (“freedom is retroactive” [Organs
Without Bodies 112]). The final strand in my reading of Catch-22 is thus,
once again, in line with my arguments that temporality and its après-coup
trajectory are fundamental to the ideological strategies of the text. Insofar as
the noumenal realm of freedom is inaccessible to us, it only becomes
apparent through the void displayed, via temporality, in the phenomenal
realm. In ÎiÏek’s words, “the space of freedom is not a magic gap in this
first-level causal chain but my ability retrospectively to choose/determine
which causes will determine me. ‘Ethics,’ at its most elementary, stands for
the courage to accept this responsibility” (The Parallax View 203). When Orr
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is discovered to have escaped to freedom, Yossarian retroactively realises
that he has “always-already” known Orr’s plans; he simply did not fit
together the pieces of the enigma set for him. Part of this lay in his
misrecognition of Orr as a nemesis (rather like Aarfy), rather than as an alter-
ego/ego-ideal to be empathised with and emulated. Further, he misrecognises
the continual crash-landings undergone by Orr as signs of his ineptitude, and
thus refuses Orr’s offer to fly with him; it is this misrecognition that places
him in the plane with the “beardless kid” Huple and the “nervous nut” Dobbs.
Hence, he is himself responsible for being in the plane when Snowden dies.
The contradiction assumed by Yossarian is not that he suddenly becomes
responsible for himself, his actions and others, but that he realises he always
has been responsible: “There is no empirical founding act of freedom; it is
rather that, in a complex and gradual process, the subject all of a sudden—
not so much becomes ‘free’ and ‘responsible,’ but—retroactively becomes
aware that he already was ‘responsible’” (The Parallax View 244, emphasis
in original). Far from being an oppressive weight, this is fully as liberating
as the Sartrean mode of freedom. Similarly, Yossarian seems to take some
sort of responsibility for Nately’s whore’s vengeful mania, neither seeming
to begrudge it and, in setting out to save her sister, perhaps partially
accepting it. Whilst he says that “maybe I was the only one in sight that
she could hate when she got the news [of Nately’s death]” (457), there
is another implication that we might suggest. As a “placeholder” within
the U.S. military, Yossarian in a sense does represent the “assassinos”
that killed Nately. It is thereafter his imperative to run away from the
responsibility of his socio-symbolic identity, and towards a new set of
responsibilities.
In Chiesa’s earlier definition of “traversing the fantasy,” the key
element was the “formation of a new master-signifier” (191). I wonder,
however, if from the perspective of Yossarian’s flight in Catch-22 we might
discern a slightly different end-point or, more accurately, an alternative
“ending-process.” In Chiesa’s formulation,
[i]f the sinthome were to include the formation of a new
fundamental fantasy, and the “new manner of repetition” …
corresponded to the emergence of a truly original fundamental
fantasy—the unavoidable counterpart of a radically innovative
master-signifier—then one can discern the outline of a politics
which can deservedly claim to have inherited the legacy of
Lacan’s ethics of jouissance. (191)
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Whilst an alternative fundamental fantasy is broached in the text, through
Yossarian’s other-directed solicitude (firstly for Snowden, and then for
Nately’s whore’s sister), I would suggest certain grounds for caution over
the search for a new master-signifier in Catch-22. The master-signifier
tends, perhaps inevitably, to be congealed and naturalised within a particular
socio-symbolic framework. And, insofar as Catch-22 partakes of the same
trajectory as the drive— especially with the way it ends with Yossarian in
flight—we might suggest that it is the process that is fundamental, and not
any particular goal (such as a master-signifier or any other particular,
contingent object). In this way, the drive-modality of Yossarian’s flight
is stressed over and above what ÎiÏek terms its “contingent/inadequate
symbolisations/translations” (Organs Without Bodies 99). Accordingly, in
Johnston’s words, a “freedom transcending mere materiality” (340) might
be maintained in the text over and above its (static) “symbolisations” in
terms of the Big Other and master-signifiers. To put it one way, a key aspect
of the counter-cultural purchase of Catch-22 upon the conjuncture of war
lies in the way that it is able to critique the monolithic power-structure
without returning a similarly monolithic viewpoint. It would seem judicious
for criticism to partake of a similar trajectory when addressing the text. 
With regard to its relationship to the power-structure, however, there is
a certain extent to which Catch-22 has a latent sense of complicity that is
seldom brought out in readings of the text, and which is put into relief by a
comparison with Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse-Five. Whilst the text manifests
an existential sense of responsibility in Yossarian, a further responsibility is
very much kept latent, namely the responsibility for civilian deaths as a result
of the blanket-bombing tactics. In Slaughterhouse-Five, the U.S. Air Force
historian, Rumfoord, tells Pilgrim to pity the men who had to do the
bombing. Rumfoord is linked with Teddy Roosevelt, and is thus portrayed
negatively, and in relation to U.S. imperialism. As one direct (if implicit)
critique of Catch-22, then, we might point to the contrast between the latter’s
portrayal of the horrors of air war from the perspective of the people doing
the bombing, and Slaughterhouse-Five’s view of the people being bombed—
from the perspective of the German “other.” It is a typically American
tendency to portray war only from the perspective of Americans; this
tendency was especially pronounced in relation to the Vietnam War, where
even a fairly subversive text such as Michael Herr’s Dispatches (1977) still
excludes the perspective of the Vietnamese “other” almost totally. It seems
that this is a tendency Slaughterhouse-Five seeks to militate against (and one
that, broadly speaking, echoes the stance of Catch-22 that might be seen to
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pity the men who had to do the bombing). In short, by comparison with
Slaughterhouse-Five, we might suggest that pitying the men who had to do
it in Catch-22 may bleed into an apologist stance on behalf of the bombers,
at the expense of the other, and that Slaughterhouse-Five reverses this stance.
It would seem to dramatise a key ethical problem involved in the portrayal of
war, therefore, that pity (or solicitude) for a particular subject may well
involve the occlusion of an “other.” The responsibilities and complicities
inherent in the representation of war are multifarious and insidious, therefore,
and whilst Catch-22 embodies a thoroughgoing search for a mode of being
at a distance from those complicities, the comparison with Slaughterhouse-
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